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1.  
 
 The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large 
sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell 
in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from 
his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, 
brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for 
his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the 
terrible crimes he has freely committed. The first two cases are cases where justice 
seems ill-served, where someone’s good or ill-fortune reflects not what they deserve 
but mere luck. The second two are cases where justice seems to be honoured: what 
befalls Scientist and Murderer reflects not their good or bad luck but their merits and 
deserts. 
 
                                                 
1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 
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 As is notorious, closer examination may begin to undermine these judgements. 
Scientist may have worked hard for his results but not for his brains. Even if 
Millionaire’s Daughter were to study as hard as he has, perhaps she lacks the native 
talent that take him to Stockholm. That, no less than her parents' great wealth, seems a 
matter of sheer luck.  
 
 Murderer’s case seems less questionable but this appearance can be subverted. 
Consider a further case, that of Accident Victim. Accident Victim is a sweet-natured, 
very decent man who has never hurt a fly. Then one day, innocently involved in a 
road accident, he receives some serious head-injury that damages his brain. He 
survives but his personality is radically changed by what has happened. He is now 
extremely volatile, violent, ill-natured and is soon in trouble with the law. We 
condemn what he does but it is hard to blame him. For his misdeeds stem from his 
changed nature, a nature which he has not chosen but which itself stems from his 
sheer bad luck in falling victim to his accident. Neurophysiological damage has left 
him with the brain of a criminal. Admitting that this exculpates him may however 
have worrying consequences. For perhaps Murderer is ultimately no less excusable on 
similar grounds. He too perhaps has a neurophysiological constitution very different 
from that which sweet-natured Accident Victim enjoys before things go wrong for 
him. The only difference may be that for Murderer this constitution is innate. 
Constitutive luck has nonetheless made him the man he is and how can we blame him 
for that? 
 
 This is how the morally subverting dialectic of hard determinism gets off the 
ground, generalizing into the thought that, if determinism is true, constitutive luck 
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makes all of us all that we are. No less than Millionaire’s Daughter, Scientist is the 
happy beneficiary of good luck; no less than Hostage, Murderer the unhappy victim of 
bad. The dialectic is traditionally resisted by libertarian insistences that we sometimes 
originate our own actions, not simply as a result of causal antecedents further down a 
long deterministic chain that reaches back long before our births, but in some 
contrasting way, that somehow makes possible an authorship of our deeds that frees 
us from the dominion of luck. However such resistance seems futile insofar as 
compromising determinism seems to lead nowhere but to indeterminism and 
indeterministic processes seem the very paradigm of processes governed by luck.  
 
 If libertarianism seem to offer little solace against the subversive dialectic, we 
may turn instead to the resources of compatibilism. Compatibilists allow for the 
possibility that all we do was determined long ago by events that lie outside our 
sphere of control, but insist that this leaves room for freedom and responsibility. The 
differences between Millionaire’s Daughter and Scientist, or between Murderer and 
Hostage, do not - plausibly could not - go as metaphysically "deep" as the libertarian 
would like to believe. But differences remain: Scientist’s self-denying hard work and 
Murderer’s crimes involve actions they freely elected to do, actions reflective of the 
choices they have made where these in turn reflect their character and this in turn, at 
least up to a point, reflects their earlier choices. This is not true of Millionaire's 
Daughter’s inherited windfall or Hostage’s captivity. These differences, the 
compatibilist may grant, do not suffice to eliminate the ultimate contribution of luck. 
But there remain excellent reasons why we should design and sustain practices and 
institutions that give them weight.  
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 Enter Saul Smilansky with this complex and subtle new work, an original and 
challenging book which anyone interested in the free will problem will wish to read. 
Smilansky rejects all three standard perspectives: hard determinism, libertarianism 
and compatibilism, at least in unqualified forms. Hard determinism - or at least an 
unqualified, "monistic" form of hard determinism - is rejected in the light of such 
compatibilist thoughts as I just now rehearsed. But compatibilism - at least an 
unqualified, monistic form of it - is itself rejected by appealing back again to the hard 
determinist dialectic: from what he calls the ultimate perspective, the differences in 
which compatibilism trades are ultimately a matter of luck and so are morally quite 
arbitrary. The Fortunate Criminal (pp. 51-52), the guy who turns out bad in spite of 
not having had a deprived childhood, not having been driven to his crimes by 
desperate economic circumstances, not being stupid or insane, has, in compatibilist 
terms, no excuse for what he does. But, ultimately, like Accident Victim, he has a 
compelling ground for exculpation: ultimately luck has made him this way. 
Ultimately he is a victim of injustice when he is punished. This ultimate perspective 
supplies real insights which compatibilism is charged with a complacent shallowness 
for disregarding.  
 
 Given his rejection of compatibilism and hard determinism, one might expect 
Smilansky to be a libertarian - there would seem nowhere else to go. But he is not. He 
rejects libertarianism no less strongly, agreeing with the Hobbesian tradition that 
convicts libertarianism of incoherence. The main originality of his book lies in his 
insistence that there is somewhere else to go, a somewhere else that is encapsulated in 
what he calls the Fundamental Dualism and what he sees as the pivotal role of 
illusion. 
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 This talk of a Fundamental Dualism signals his recognition of the "partial 
validity" of both hard determinism and compatibilism. On this view, punishment, 
justified up to a point in compatibilist terms, is in differing ways, at once just and 
unjust. On the one hand, it is morally imperative for us to live in a Community of 
Responsibility (p. 83) in which people are held responsible - or not - for what they do 
in compatibilist terms.  The differences compatibilists emphasize, differences in the 
extent to which our actions are, in a metaphysically unassuming, everyday, sense, up 
to us, are not only real but also normatively significant insofar as giving them weight 
in contexts of distributive and retributive justice is vitally important to people and a 
central aspect of what it is to respect them. We need, on the other hand, to recognize 
the ultimate injustice of treating people in terms of compatibilist distinctions. For, in 
an ultimate sense, nothing is up to us. So Fortunate Criminal is at once justly punished 
and a victim of ultimate level injustice. 
 
 To preempt a natural misunderstanding, this partial validity of compatibilism 
is not, according to Smilansky, at all illusory. A compatibilist understanding truly is 
valid, he thinks - if only up to a point and only in the context of the Fundamental 
Dualism. Compatibilists err only in imagining the distinctions they draw, and the 
normative significance attaching to them, to be the whole story, in supposing there to 
be nothing at all to be said for the hard determinist’s perspective; just as the hard 
determinist’s error was to give no weight at all to the compatibilist’s distinctions. 
Smilansky's Fundamental Dualism is his attempt to recognize what he considers the 
truth in both perspectives. 
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 The illusion whose role Smilansky places centre stage in the second part of the 
book is not illusion about the validity of compatibilism but an illusory belief in the 
truth of libertarianism. He thinks that such an illusory belief is widespread and, more 
controversially, that this is a broadly welcome state of affairs: illusion about free will 
plays a role in our lives and this role is an important and legitimate one. This 
legitimacy reflects two “problems” which Smilansky calls the Dissonance Problem 
and the Insufficiency Problem. 
 
 The Dissonance Problem stems from the Fundamental Dualism. The thought 
appears to be that the two perspectives, hard determinism and compatibilism, both of 
which the Fundamental Dualism aims somehow partially to endorse, pull us in 
opposite directions in morally threatening ways. Compatibilist distinctions are real 
and normatively significant but the partial correctness of the hard determinist dialectic 
is all too liable to undermine them. "The fragile compatibilist-level plants need to be 
defended from the chill of the ultimate perspective in the hothouse of illusion." (p. 
173) 
 
 The Dissonance Problem reflects the tension set in place by the Fundamental 
Dualism. The Insufficiency Problem is in a way simpler, simply reflecting the absence 
of libertarian free will. Given this absence, we are never ultimately responsible for 
what we are or do and Smilansky argues that anything short of such ultimate 
responsibility fails to suffice for normatively central notions of justice and respect - 
including self-respect - to apply to our lives and actions in any but, as he puts it, 
"shallow" ways. 
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2.  
 
 Smilansky’s argument begins with what he calls the Core Conception. This is 
the thought that an absolutely central role in our moral thinking, in particular our 
thinking about justice, responsibility and blame is played by notions of what is under 
our control, what is up to us. The centrality of this role is such that any way of 
conceiving of justice that is not sensitive to considerations of what is or is not up to 
the people to whom that conception is applied would be morally unacceptable to us. 
(This is why Smilansky assigns partial validity only to that form of compatibilism - 
control compatibilism - that preserves an intimate and essential connection between 
justice and "up to usness", rejecting as hopeless those consequentialist forms - effect 
compatibilism - that leave the connection more contingent and fragile.) 
 
 As Smilansky acknowledges (pp. 15, 21-22), the Core Conception is 
ambivalent. The notions of "up to usness" and “control” invite both a metaphysically 
modest compatibilist reading and a metaphysically less unassuming incompatibilist 
reading. The compatibilist might then accept the Core Conception but insist on a 
compatibilist interpretation of it. Here the debate threatens to stalemate in by now 
notorious ways. For such ambiguity infects almost all significant terms in the debate 
about free will and responsibility, starting with "free" and "responsible" themselves, 
and including "control", "up to us", "could have done otherwise" and so on. Each has 
an immodest incompatibilist reading that is favoured by those who insist on a kind of 
responsibility and control that is in some sense ultimate and a more modest 
compatibilist reading that is not. (Henceforth I will signal these contrasting senses by 
the subscripts "U" [for "ultimate"] and "C" [for "compatibilist"].) Robert Kane has 
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recently argued with impressive plausibility that the challenge for the incompatibilist 
is then to motivate his favoured interpretations of these concepts in some non-
question-begging way.2  
 
One way of understanding of Smilansky's approach is as acknowledging this 
systematic ambiguity of the Core Conception itself. Thus we might say, as well as 
there being responsibilityC and responsibilityU, controlC and controlU, we have also 
justiceC and justiceU, moralityC and moralityU. One could then claim that we can’t 
have justiceU and moralityU without having desertU and responsibilityU and controlU 
but that for justiceC we need only desertC, responsibilityC and controlC. We could then 
reach a preliminary understanding of Smilansky's Fundamental Dualism as the view 
that both the "deep" but morally threatening justiceU and the "shallow" but 
"pragmatically prior" (see pp. 102-3) justiceC are important and desirable and that any 
position that insists that either is the whole story must be simplistic and incomplete. 
 
 However this way of understanding the matter raises a stark worry: it seems 
deeply problematic, given Smilansky’s granting to the compatibilist of the 
incoherence of libertarian free will. If freedomU is incoherent, how can it be worth 
wanting? And if it is a condition for justiceU, how can that be worth wanting? In 
chapter 3 (at pp. 48-50), Smilansky considers this worry that nothing incoherent can 
be worth wanting and dismisses it, to my mind, rather too fast.  
 
                                                 
2 In The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), Part I. Kane himself 
makes an ingenious attempt to meet this challenge (see esp. chapters 5 and 6), discussion of which is 
outwith the scope of this critical study. 
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 When wishes are more or less idle, perhaps we should not be much troubled 
by their incoherence. People may want all manner of odd things and so what? But the 
wishes that concern Smilansky being, as he constantly stresses, so very far from idle, 
we should plausibly take their incoherence as more problematic.  
 
 Still it might seem to make sense to regret the falsehood of incoherencies. 
Some things, writes Smilansky “remain worth wanting even if something that would 
be necessary in order to have them is not worth wanting because it cannot be 
coherently conceived. It is just this, the impossibility of the conditions for things that 
are so deeply worth wanting, which makes the realization of the absence of libertarian 
free will so significant. ” (p. 50) There is some initial plausibility to these remarks. 
Take a less philosophically vexed example. A research project in mathematics might 
turn out to have an incoherent aim and it might make very natural sense for a 
mathematician who has devoted much of his life to the project to regret this fact. He 
might wish the project he had devoted his best years to had not been a waste of his 
time. It is a consequence of the incoherence of his project that he has spent his career 
on a wild goose chase; so it might seem that if he can coherently regret that he has 
wasted his years, he may also, in a sense, properly regret that his project is incoherent.  
 
His thought would then begin from the perfectly sensible-seeming wish: 
 
W1. Would that I had not wasted my career. 
 
He knows, let us go on to suppose, that: 
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C1. I did not waste my career → Project P is coherent. 
 
Whence, by a kind of optative modus ponens, we might urge, it can intelligibly be 
said: 
 
W2. Would that project P were coherent. 
 
Here something coherently worth wanting - that our mathematician's career was not 
wasted on a wild goose chase - obtains only if P is coherent. Just as, for Smilansky, 
we can have justiceU only if we have libertarian free will. 
 
C2. We can sometimes justlyU blameU people → we have libertarian free will.. 
 
Whence, again applying optative modus ponens, someone who wants justiceU may, in 
a sense, properly want libertarian free will, just in virtue of wanting something for 
which that is a condition.  
 
However things are not so straightforward. Optative modus ponens is a rather 
dubious rule of inference. For it would seem to commit someone who desires that P to 
desire that Q whenever P → Q. And, if we read "→" as a material conditional, that 
looks disastrous. For that commits us, when we desire some false P to desire Q, where 
Q is any proposition you like, say the proposition that everyone dies tomorrow. Just 
one unsatisfied want now commits us to wanting everything!3
 
                                                 
3 I am indebted at this point to Bob Hale. 
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This objection lapses if we read "→" as something stronger than a material 
conditional. And it may seem to help Smilansky that, in the case of C2, this is very 
plausible. For, if I read Smilansky aright, there is nothing contingent about the link 
between libertarian free will and justiceU: the tie between them has rather the force of 
necessity. But if we understand the conditional this way, a different problem arises. 
For  
 
L(P → Q) |= L¬Q → L¬P 
 
(unlike 
 
P → Q |= L¬Q → L¬P) 
 
is more or less uncontroversially a valid modal principle. So if we read the conditional 
in C2 as a strict conditional, the incoherence of libertarian free will is going to infect 
ultimate level justice itself. If something incoherent is a strictly necessary condition 
for X then X is incoherent too. So if libertarian free will is a strictly necessary 
condition for ultimate level justice and libertarian free will is incoherent, then ultimate 
level justice is itself incoherent. And if ultimate level justice is itself incoherent, 
Smilansky’s position is in a very thoroughgoing sort of trouble. Perhaps it could be 
thought to make some sense to respect and promote a conception of morality one 
acknowledges itself makes no sense at all. Wittgenstein once expressed just such an 
attitude.4 But if a certain debate in philosophy comes down to a conflict over which of 
two rival interpretations of some fundamental value such as justice is the one we 
                                                 
4 See Ludwig Wittgenstein: "Lecture on Ethics" in Philosophical Review 64, 1975 
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should prefer, the conclusion that one - but only one -of the rivals is plain incoherent 
is surely as nasty a blow as can be delivered if moral philosophy is to have any chance 
of being itself a coherent research project. 
 
It is puzzling then how something incoherent can be desirable. It is more 
puzzling still how something incoherent can be deep. Smilansky writes (p.52):  
 
not to take the absence of libertarian free will seriously is not to take justice 
seriously. Positions that fail to do so and remain on the compatibilist level will 
inevitably be morally superficial. 
 
"Justice" here means of course justiceU and Smilansky's central claims about illusion 
are premised on the thought that there is something strikingly deep about such justice. 
But if libertarian free will is a strict condition for justiceU and libertarian free will is 
an incoherent nonsense, then justiceU is an incoherent nonsense also and incoherent 
nonsense is never deep. 
 
3 
 
 We are helped in making sense of the Fundamental Dualism if we view the 
problem for compatibilism, as Smilansky suggests, as a "Slippery-Slope" problem (p. 
173; cf. p. 103). The worry then is that the rationale for insisting on ultimate control, 
ultimate responsibility, ultimate justice is not distinct from the rationale for controlC, 
responsibilityC and justiceC but a continuation (cf. p. 54) of it. On this reading we 
should see a certain dialectical intimacy holding between justiceU and justiceC such 
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that justiceU is something we are liable to find ourselves committed to if we think in a 
clearheaded way about the roots of our commitment to justiceC. This is close to 
Smilansky’s intentions, as when, for example, he tells us (p. 77) that compatibilism is 
“faulty for not following through with the question of control”.  
 
The thought is then this. In order to avoid a morally nightmarish society we 
have to recognize a principle that people can’t be justly held responsible and blamed 
for what is not up to them, not under their control. But once this principle is on the 
table, the compatibilist wants to limit its application. If he can’t limit its application - 
and he cannot - the danger looms that it applies globally. For ultimately nothing is up 
to anybody. So once we recognize that control matters, as it would be morally 
unthinkable not to, we have to recognize that ultimate control matters, for ultimate 
control is what we become concerned about when we carry our concern for control 
through to its limit.  
 
Imagine we begin with a nihilistic view of the moral world where we attach no 
significance to what a person freely does within the sphere of his control. We then 
recognize the importance of control and start to make the sort of distinctions that pull 
Millionaire’s Daughter apart from Scientist, Hostage apart from Murderer. We are 
now in the business of creating an ethically satisfying Community of Responsibility. 
But we got into this business only by recognizing the importance of control. And, 
having recognized this we are off on a slippery slope that will lead us to insist on 
ultimate control. And this is a slippery slope back to something like our starting 
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point.5 For, in the absence of libertarian free will, we have ultimate control of nothing 
and the consequence of insisting on such control is that all the distinctions disappear 
again. At each extreme of this spectrum the moral landscape is brutally flattened, at 
one because we deny the significance of the crucial distinction, at the other because, 
while we grant its significance, we believe it nowhere to make a difference. We need 
a place to stop on the slippery slope and there is no principled stopping point. We 
cannot, as Smilansky puts it, "stop in the middle"(p. 47). All we can do is continue in 
the illusion that there is such a principled place and we do this by accepting libertarian 
free will. That is to involve ourselves in illusion but that is a price worth paying.  
 
This is an interesting and genuinely worrying thought: that decent and 
civilized life demands that we go some distance in giving weight to considerations of 
up to usness and control but demands too that we not go the whole distance. For that 
would leave us with the ethically unacceptable perspective of a monistic hard 
determinism. We must stop somewhere but there is no even roughly determinate place 
where considerations of justice demand that we stop.  
 
Addressing this worry is a central task for compatibilism, a task, it seems to 
me, which recent compatibilist writers, notably R. Jay Wallace and T. M. Scanlon6, 
have made more impressive progress than comes clearly across from Smilansky's 
                                                 
5 Not exactly like, on Smilansky's view. For his version of Hard Determinism is not morally nihilistic 
and respects the Core Conception. It doesn't allow that any two people differ in what they deserve but, 
just because of this, leaves open the possibility that all kinds of actions be demanded by way of 
rectificatory justice. Central here is Smilansky's highly interesting notion of an egalitarian "baseline" of 
desert which, in a longer study, would merit more discussion than I can give it here.  
6 See R. Jay Wallace: Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1994) and T. M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1998), chapter 6. 
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partial discussion of compatibilism. This study is not the place fully to address this 
task though I will close the final section with some brief remarks that may bear on it.  
 
4 
 
 Smilansky's argument for the necessity of illusion rests, as I noted, on the 
Dissonance Problem and the Insufficiency Problem. Getting clear about the former 
may help us get clear about the Fundamental Dualism. Sometimes here Smilansky 
expresses the problem is rather unhappy ways, as e.g. when he says the problem with 
working with both compatibilist and ultimate-level truths is that these are "contrary" 
to each other (pp. 175, 287). Clearly insofar as both these things are true they cannot 
be contrary in the straightforward sense that implies inconsistency and elsewhere 
Smilansky makes it quite clear that this is not what he intends. Thus he concedes to 
W. D. Ross that "the truth cannot be inconsistent with itself"7 and stresses that that he 
does not claim otherwise. His claim is rather that the truth is complex (p. 37-38),  "an 
admixture of elements" from compatibilism and hard determinism (p. 193).  
 
 However if we understand the Fundamental Dualism in this way, we see that 
the dissonance emphasized by the Dissonance Problem is not that deep. The central 
fear Smilansky airs in discussing the Dissonance Problem is that recognizing the truth 
in the ultimate perspective will sap our moral motivation. It will sap our motivation to 
be good by undermining our sense of the worth that accrues to us from goodness. And 
it will sap our motivation not to do wrong by offering us, in advance, a ready made 
excuse our awareness of which is liable to influence us for the worse. However the 
                                                 
7 He is quoting from The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 328 
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concern is not that the ultimate perspective, in the wider context of the complex 
dualistic truth, licenses these motivational deteriorations. For the norms of a 
Community of Responsibility rule them out and these norms, Smilansky thinks, are 
fully justified. Rather his worry is that, as a matter of empirical fact, these unhappy 
consequences are what we can, in practice, expect. (Just as someone might agree with 
Plato that we do not, speaking philosophically, need God to make conceptual sense of 
morality, while agreeing with Durkheim that it is nonetheless an empirical fact that, in 
practice, religious belief plays a crucial role in sustaining moral codes.) 
 
Smilansky's talk of a single complex truth may seem, on the face of it, rather 
odd. As standardly understood, the issue of the truth of compatibilism is just the issue 
of the compatibility or otherwise of two claims - that we have freedom adequate to 
being held responsible and that determinism is true - and any two unequivocal claims 
are either compatible or they are not (putting issues of vagueness, which Smilansky 
does not emphasize, to one side). The point once again seems to be that the two 
claims are not unequivocal. This is what Smilansky suggests when he tell us that: 
 
The Compatibility Question might be answered in a Yes-No fashion, for there is 
no conceptual reason why it should not be the case that certain forms of moral 
responsibility require libertarian free will, while other forms could be sustained 
without it. (p. 37)  
 
A passage such as this again invites us to understand the Fundamental 
Dualism in terms of a claim that we need freedomU to have responsibilityU and 
responsibilityU to have justiceU, but that we can have justiceC with merely 
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responsibilityC and freedomC suffices for that. However a natural and especially 
alarming way of understanding the Dissonance Problem might be as suggesting that, 
without illusion, even the values implicated in justiceC, respectC and moralityC, the 
compatibilistically justifiable values that constitute and inform a Community of 
Responsibility, would, as a matter of empirical fact, be threatened and undermined: 
that we would, without illusion, be worse off in their terms. So, if we cannot believe 
in the possibility of justiceU and respectU, we will lack the motivation needed to 
sustain our commitments even to justiceC and respectC. The claim would then be that, 
while, responsibilityC and controlC suffice philosophically to make justiceC possible, 
we need, in practice, to believe we have responsibilityU and controlU to keep even our 
commitment to justiceC alive. This is a key way the Dissonance problem might be 
taken to contrast with the Insufficiency Problem, the latter embodying the claim that 
justiceC itself is shallow and inadequate. If this is correct the Dissonance problem, 
even if less deep than the Insufficiency Problem is intended to be, could speak even to 
those, like myself, who view justiceU with some scepticism. 
 
 The claim implicated in the Dissonance Problem is an empirical but an 
interesting one. As with all empirical claims, what is at claimed may well be true but 
its truth is largely beyond our competence as philosophers. Of course philosophers 
might do much to show that the claim somehow "stands to reason" by spelling out the 
patterns of thought by which we are supposedly threatened and showing how much 
prima facie sense they make, how seductive they can be - I guess this is what 
Smilansky is seeking to do in talking the Dissonance Problem up. But much of what 
he says does not have me convinced.  
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Thus, for example, at a central point in making his case for our need for 
illusion he invites us, very dramatically (p. 158), to consider two worlds, the Control 
Compatibilist's Dream World and the Control Compatibilist's Nightmare World. In 
the former people are blamed and punished only if and to the extent that they are 
guilty. In the latter those who are blamed and punished are all innocent. In other 
respects the two worlds are supposed the same. It is then stressed that, "from the 
ultimate perspective...there is nothing to choose between these worlds." This shows 
how deep the divide is between the ultimate and compatibilist perspectives such that, 
trying to live with both perspectives is apt to detract from our "moral seriousness of 
purpose".  
 
 I find it hard to see why this example is supposed to worry us. Given that the 
Fundamental Dualism is intended to respect the principle of noncontradiction, the 
thought cannot of course be that there both is and is not something to choose between 
the two worlds. Rather the thought must be that, in one, entirely valid, respect, there is 
nothing to choose while, in another, also entirely valid, respect, there is plenty to 
choose. In which case we surely have the straightforward upshot that, all things 
considered, there is plenty to choose. If I have tons of money in my Swiss bank 
account and no money at all in my Cayman Islands bank account, how much money 
do I have? Well, tons... 
  
 I suspect that, on close inspection, it turns out that the Dissonance Problem is 
resting on the Insufficiency Problem; that Smilansky's thought here is that it is 
because people are alive to what the Insufficiency Problem shows us to be the 
shallowness of justiceC, desertC, respectC etc. that they will find their motivation to 
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take these things seriously (even in their compatibilistic senses) undermined unless 
they can give credence to the applicability of these same concepts in their "deeper", 
ultimate senses. Certainly the metaphor of depth pervades Smilansky's 
characterization of the Dissonance Problem in ways that invite this reading, as e.g. 
when he writes (p. 153) that:  
 
in a world without libertarian free-will there is only the significantly shallower 
compatibilist variety available. If one thinks that whatever one does will not be 
worthy or cherished as under libertarian assumptions, this may harm motivation.  
 
If this diagnosis is correct, we will be apt to take the Dissonance Problem less 
seriously to the extent that we fail to be impressed by the Insufficiency Problem. I 
think, on the whole, we should so fail. One part of the story about why I think this 
was told in section 2 above: incoherence and depth make implausible bedfellows. I 
will conclude by briefly sketching another. 
 
5 
 
 The Insufficiency Problem is intended to go deeper than the Dissonance 
Problem, to show the shallowness of a simplistic compatibilism. Here, as noted above, 
I take it that the aim is not to show that living without illusion would leave us worse 
off in terms even of justiceC and respectC but to show how these, the kinds of justice 
and respect available to a compatibilist, are themselves inadequate and that we can 
make sense of a richer set of values only if we presuppose libertarian free will.  
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 To argue this, one has to meet Kane's challenge by appealing to something 
that carries weight with us independently of the issue that divides the parties. For 
Smilansky it is the notion of depth that does this work. It is to this notion, above all 
that he appeals to urge that there is a set of values which find no application when we 
believe merely in up to usnessC, which are applicable only when we believe in 
libertarian free will, and that these values cannot be dispensed with without great loss. 
In particular, he argues, the pursuit of depth will lead us to give weight to the sort of 
ultimate level injustice that is violated when the Fortunate Criminal, or any other 
criminal, is punished for actions that were not, ultimately, up to him and to the sort of 
deep respect - and self-respect - that comes from seeing people - including ourselves - 
as the ultimate authors of their actions, values that are threatened when we see either 
the hero or the villain as "simply an unfolding of what he happens to be" (p. 163). 
 
Here we may properly be sceptical. Take the case of respect first. Here 
Smilansky gives the example of a successful athlete, of whom he writes:  
 
Having to subject his life to the ultimate hard determinist perspective could be 
truly tragic for such a person, for he may well have oriented years of his life 
around the thought of a medal, not for its own sake but as a token of his ultimate 
level superiority (p. 198) 
 
Imagine then such a successful athlete, someone highly talented and motivated who 
has worked his butt off for his success and carried off all the prizes. For all kinds of 
good compatibilist reasons Smilansky will recognize, we will honour and reward this 
athlete’s accomplishments. This is, thus far, a great life, great in ways most other lives 
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fall short of. In a sense, we might recognize that this is all luck. And surely the athlete 
might recognize this too without moral loss: he might surely recognize that for all that 
he has achieved he is ultimately just lucky, privileged, blessed. And he might simply 
rejoice in being so blessed, rejoice that fortune’s favour has enabled him to fulfill the 
athlete’s calling to excellence and competitive success. That he sees it as a case of, 
ultimately, privilege prevents him from running away with the thought of his 
superiority to others but surely that is all to the good: surely nobody should run away 
with that thought. A wise man should find nothing tragic in a becoming humility.8
 
Turning to questions of justice, I remain quite unclear about what is so terrible 
and shallow about recognizing, as Scanlon has urged we should, that 
 
our attitude toward those who suffer or are blamed should not be “You asked 
for this” but rather “There but for the grace of God go I.”9  
 
With respect to the fortunate criminal, there need be nothing subversive of justice in 
the thought that Scanlon recommends. Here there is certainly something tragic; but if 
we at least recognize, as Smilansky recommends, the pragmatic priority of the 
compatibilist perspective, what in our practice need this recognition threaten to 
subvert in such a way that we gain anything from kidding ourselves on about free 
                                                 
8 Smilansky has suggested (private correspondence) that this response does not touch the worry that the 
athlete's efforts are different, as a source of pride from something like his height, that a form of "quasi-
moral appreciation" is involved in his pride in this. I don't think this reply effective. We do take pride 
in features like height but this is certainly very different from the sort of pride we take in effort. This is 
very plausibly primarily because effort differs from height in lying in the sphere of what we are 
properly (and with a straightforwardly compatibilistic rationale) held accountable for. For the athlete's 
coach, for his fans, for the National Sports Council who gave him a big grant, his effort will be the 
focus of normative expectations that would be quite inappropriately directed at his height. At least 
that's my story about why pride and respect directed at effort are "quasi-moral" in ways our admiration 
of tall people is not and you need have no illusions about libertarian free will to believe it. Cf. Scanlon, 
op. cit., chapter 6, section 4. 
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will? Indeed our practices may gain from such recognition. Penology may well be 
civilized by the recognition that a certain deep egalitarianism is justified: an 
egalitarianism, to follow Smilansky himself (p. 125) in echoing Stephen Darwall's 
distinction10, of recognition respect, sitting alongside an honest and unavoidable 
inegalitarianism of appraisal respect. This egalitarianism may protect the successful 
athlete from a foolish arrogance and it may protect the fortunate criminal from 
barbarism that may result where our contempt for wrongdoers is not restrained as we 
all wish it to be. This sense of restraint may lie behind the opposition of many people 
and societies to the death penalty; and behind the way in which even where some 
think this sometimes to be tolerated, we may show, even with an Eichmann, a not 
inconsiderable restraint, an insistence on a swift and merciful mode of execution, a 
repudiation of humiliation and torture. The most monstrous of criminals show their 
victims no such restraint and, while we can readily imagine someone to say of them 
that they deserve to be done by as they do, it is precisely to such people that it may 
well be said: there but for the grace of God go you also. If there is that much truth in 
the ultimate perspective, then plausibly the very last thing we should do is to bury and 
suppress it. 
 
 For Smilansky, our punishment of Murderer, of Fortunate Criminal, even of 
Eichmann, is a case, as he puts it, of "unavoidable injustice" (or "structural injustice", 
see pp. 256-258, 291). But this seems questionable. Part of the problem is perhaps 
right at the start when, in characterizing the Core Conception, Smilansky insistently 
places desert right at the foundation of our notion of justice - his central objection to 
Scanlonian contractualism being that it fails, as Scanlon himself would happily 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Scanlon, op. cit., p. 294 
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concede11, to offer desert a fundamental role. But it is not so implausible to 
characterize justice broadly as the best set of principles we human beings can find and 
apply for the regulation of our lives together; nor indeed to think of the best such 
principles as principles to which reasonable people may most readily be expected 
freely to agree. In constructing such principles, we see the need for a punitive system 
of criminal law to protect us from harm and we constrain its operation to make our 
liability to its rigours sensitive to the choices we make. To say that is to follow Hart 
and others, in characterizing the general justifying aim of punishment without 
reference to desert but finding good reason to suppose that the distributive constraints 
on it on which reasonable citizens are most apt to wish to insist will make the 
principles of its distribution sensitive to choice and so reflecting of controlC and 
desertC.12  
 
In the context of such a conception of justice, we may well be tempted to 
speak of a form of "injustice" that is implicated in any punishment at all, given that all 
our actions may be just the unfolding of, ultimately, impersonal circumstances. But 
this is not injustice, properly speaking, at all. Injustice is prohibited by the best 
principles for the governance of human communities and not all punishment is so 
prohibited. Talk of "unavoidable injustice" is a somewhat paradoxical use of the term, 
a nonmoral deployment of an essentially moral concept. The point is strengthened by 
considering that Smilansky's unavoidable injustice is to be understood as injusticeU 
and that, as we saw above, there are compelling grounds to suppose that, if 
Smilansky's own claims about the incoherence of libertarian free will are correct, that 
                                                                                                                                            
10 See Stephen L. Darwall: "Two Kinds of Respect" in Robin S. Dillon (ed.): Dignity, Character and 
Self-Respect (New York, Routledge, 1995). 
11 Op. cit., pp. 274-277. 
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incoherence is shared by his own talk of ultimate injustice. A concern for justiceU 
takes us down Smilansky's slippery slope but leads to paradox and incoherence. With 
justiceC, understood roughly as I have proposed, there is no paradox, no incoherence 
and plausibly no comparable slipperiness. These seem excellent reasons to believe 
that justiceC is justice. 
 
Talk of unavoidable tragedy is less misleading. If we think at all, we may see 
it as tragic when good people come to harm. And, if we think deeply, we may see it is 
tragic when anybody comes to harm. But sometimes people do come to harm, 
sometimes they come to harm at each other's hands and sometimes they come to harm 
legitimately. Not all the ways we legitimately harm people are sensitive to their 
desertsC.13 Some very properly are. They are just, in either case, when they respect the 
constraints on harming people the best principles for the governance of a decent 
human society lay down. But if they do this, though they may be tragic, they are not 
unjust. It would be idle to deny that life is, in many ways, tragic, mistaken to contest 
the thought that something tragic happens when Murderer, Accident Victim or even 
Fortunate Criminal is led away for punishment.14 With that much of what Smilansky 
claims we should all perhaps agree. But, while we would perhaps be happier if we let 
                                                                                                                                            
12 See especially H. L. A. Hart: Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 8ff. 
13  Think of warfare, of quarantine, or of the small but widespread risks, certain to result in harm to 
some few people, that are knowingly and often justifiably imposed by many large scale enterprises and 
activities. 
14 Even in saying this is tragic am I not conceding that libertarian free will, however incoherent, is 
worth wanting after all? No. What is tragic is that horrible things happen to people, things like being 
killed in earthquakes, catching terrible diseases or being or having to be punished, quite justly, for 
committing crimes. Someone who thinks the world would be a nicer place if none of these things 
happened does not want anything incoherent. 
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ourselves be deluded about the prevalence of tragedy in human life, I seen no reason 
to believe we would thereby be morally either better off or less at risk.15
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differing views on free will problem. I am also grateful to Alexander Broadie, Bob Hale, James Harris, 
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